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ABSTRACT
SOCIAL  MEDIA  AND  FEAR:  SOCIAL  MEDIA  AS  A  CATALYST  FOR
POLITICAL  FEAR  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES
Shane  R .  White
November  19,  2010
Abstract:  Using  the  American  National  Election  Study  data
from  the  2012  and  2016  surveys  I  explore  how  social  media
usage  shapes  fear.  This  is  likely  caused  by  the  nature  of
social  media  leading  to  oversharing  of  sensationalized
articles  likely  to  elicit  an  emotional  and  fearful
response.  My  findings  suggest  first  that  social  media  usage
has  a  statistically  significant  effect  on  whether  they
would  say  they  are  afraid  of  a  candidate  (2012)  and  how
afraid  they  say  they  are  of  the  candidates  (2016).  Second,
social  media  has  little  effect  on  economic  fear,  and  may
actually  make  people  more  hopeful  about  the  economy.  Third,
that  this  effect  is  strongest  amongst  millennial  voters.
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CHAPTER  1:  INTRODUCTION
Social  media  has  become  an  increasingly  large  part  of
our  lives.  Social  media  has  evolved  since  MySpace  started
in  2005,  it  now  adds  several  platforms  including  Facebook,
Twitter,  Instagram,  Snapchat,  and  LinkedIn.  These  have
become  core  pieces  of  our  identity,  pieces  that  people  can
anonymously  peruse  and  judge.  Many  of  us  spend  hours  a  day
reading  statuses  and  tweets,  looking  at  pictures  and  other
posts.  Many  are  using  it  to  aggregate  news  and  information
feeds  all  into  one  place.
People  often  feel  that  the  world  is  becoming  a  meaner,
scarier,  more  dangerous  place.  News  articles  run
sensationalized  headlines,  like  the  Time  magazine  headline
“Why  Americans  Are  More  Afraid  Than  They  Used  to  Be”
(Rothman,  2016)  or  the  Rolling  Stone  article  “Why  We’re
Living  in  the  Age  of  Fear.  This  is  the  safest  time  in  human
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history.  So  why  are  we  all  so  afraid?”  (Strauss,  2016),
while  hard  data  says  something  different.  The  world  is
becoming  a  safer  and  less  dangerous  place.  As  a  culture,  we
are  standing  up  to  the  abuses  subjected  on  many  of  our
peers  in  the  past.  There  is  no  longer  a  looming  threat  of
nuclear  war,  and  terrorism,  the  21st  century  equivalent,  is
exceedingly  rare  in  most  of  the  world.  But,  fear  does  seem
to  be  increasing.  Social  media  algorithms  show  us  only
things  it  assumes  that  interest  us.  Has  this  made
horrifying  click  bait  seem  even  more  prominent  or  enticing?
Has  this  made  fear  about
Using  data  from  the  2012  and  2016  American  National
Election  Studies,  I  demonstrate  that  social  media  use  does
have  a  prominent  correlation  with  political  fear.  This
effect  seems  likely  to  grow  and  affect  our  society  more  and
more  as  we  progress  in  the  digital  age.
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CHAPTER  2:  LITERATURE  REVIEW
To  study  how  social  media  use  catalyzes  political
fear,multiple  factors  must  be  examined.  Direct  observation
of  this  causal  relationship  is  impossible;  there  are  no
statistics  that  are  evident  or  brain  scan  that  can  be
easily  done.  Therefore,  I  will  develop  the  relationship
between  variables  we  can  observe,  and  why  those
observations  are  likely  to  be  links  in  the  causal  chain
that  social  media  is  catalyzing  political  fear.
I  will  review  how  social  media’s  effect  on  political
behavior  has  already  been  established.  I  will  also  review
the  digital  divide  leaves  some  populations  more  vulnerable
to  influence  and  manipulation.  Furthermore,  I  will  address
how  fear  impacts  political  behavior  in  general.  I  will
examine  how  social  media  affects  emotions  in  general,  then
more  specifically  fear.  The  media,  in  general,  affects
political  fear,  and  I  propose  that  social  media  directly
influences  political  fear.
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Social  Media  and  Political  Behavior
Social  media  and  the  internet  have  changed  the  way
people  interact  with  each  other  and  their  governments.  The
ways  in  which  they  are  able  to  interact  with  each  other
have  changed  dramatically  with  the  advent  of  social  media.
Many  of  our  traditional  venues  for  interaction  with  each
other  or  our  local  political  leadership  are  fading  away
(Putnam,  2000).  The  internet  has  developed  a  new  venue  for
interacting  with  each  other  and  our  politics,  be  it  through
engaging  in  political  discussion  or  through  interaction
with  political  actors  (Bimber,  1999;  DiMaggio  et  al,  2001).
The  precarious  conclusion  is  that  the  changes  in
behavior  are  a  result  of  events  that  lead  from  exposure,
causing  a  change  in  attitudes  and  opinions,  to  the
resultant  actions  (Kruglanski  et  al,  2015).  It  assumes  that
while  the  person  is  using  social  media  they  are  exposed  to
stimuli  that  trigger  a  strong  emotional  reaction,  such  as
fear  or  anger,  making  them  want  to  take  action  in  the
situation,  more  than  specific  behaviors  that  would  be  more
comfortable  for  them  (Knoll  et  al,  2020).
Further  complicating  this  question  of  a  causal  chain
between  the  stimuli  to  actions,  we  are  looking  at  whether
the  emotional  and  attitudinal  pressure  builds  up  to  the
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level  of  inspiring  impactful  actions,  or  whether  the
release  of  pressure  of  a  low  effort  form  of  political
action,  such  as  a  tweet,  status  update  or  post  keeps  the
internal  pressure  from  building  to  the  point  that  real
behavioral  change  requires  (Hassid,  2012;  Kristofferson,
2014).
While  controversial,  because  it  seems  a  questionable
causal  argument,  studies  suggest  that  social  media  use  has
fanned  the  flames  of  many  protest  actions  around  the  world
(Bekmagambetov  et  al,  2018;  Gainous  et  al,  2015;2017).  The
more  frequently  people  participated  in  online  debate,  the
more  likely  they  were  to  participate  in  the  collective
action  that  connects  people  around  a  shared
grievance(Alberici  &  Milesi  2013).
While  there  is  some  fear  that  it  may  cause  younger
generations  to  eschew  traditional  political  participation
(Gainous  et  al,  2015),  it  seems  clear  that  there  are
influencing  factors  in  play,  even  the  dreaded  “slacktivism”
isn’t  entirely  lost  effort.  People  who  engage  even  in  token
activity  are  more  invested  in  a  cause  than  someone  who  has
not  been  involved  in  any  way.  Because  only  a  fraction  of
people  take  part  in  action,  it  doesn’t  manifest  the  desired
change,  when  millions  commit  their  support  to  making
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something  happen,  however  they  are  more  likely  to  be
involved  after  a  simple  investment  than  otherwise  (Chou  et
al,  2020;  Boulianne  &  Theocharis,  2018).  There  is  a  strong
correlation  between  online  political  activities  and  taking
part  in  offline,  and  more  traditional,  political
participation  from  contacting  politicians  ,  protesting  and
simply  voting  (Boulianne  &  Theocharis,  2018)
This  seems  to  be  made  evident  by  the  number  of
governments  that  are  attempting  to  influence  political
behavior  by  influencing  the  “digital  commons”  that  social
media  usage  explores.  Gunitsky  (2015)  addresses  how
governments  use  social  media  to  rile  up  counter  movements,
to  framing  a  cause  in  different  lights  to  change  the
framing  of  the  movement,  autocratic,  semi-autocratic
governments  and  candidates  see  the  power  that  social  media
has  on  political  behavior,  and  utilize  it  to  increase  their
influence  on  the  populace  (Gunitsky,  2015).  The  flow  of
information  that  people  experience  through  the  internet  has
a  significant  effect  on  people’s  opinions  about  their  own
government.  These  opinions  can  be  manipulated  by  the
government  in  question  or  other  organizations  affecting  the
flow  of  information(Gainous  et  al,  2016).
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People  will  use  a  medium  that  they  trust  to  get  their
news.  In  places  where  traditional  media  is  primarily
controlled,  or  at  least  influenced,  by  the  government,  they
have  been  able  to  manipulate  people  into  holding  higher
levels  of  trust.  While  people  who  are  using  social  media
are  seeing  information  from  trusted  individuals  that  may  be
critical  of  the  government.  Those  people  who  use  social
media  are  significantly  more  likely  to  have  an  emotional
response  that  leads  to  action  (Gainous  et  al,  2018).
Governments  are  also  investing  time,  expertise,  and
money  into  directly  influencing  the  algorithms  that  control
what  is  visible  on  social  media,  and  it's  more  passive
effect  on  the  populace,  and  its  tendency  to  passively
stratify  issues  and  perspectives  (Katzenbach,  20109).  This
influence  can  allow  governments  to  passively  censor  things
by  keeping  radical  ideas  near  the  bottom  of  the  feed,  while
still  allowing  those  with  radical  ideas  to  share  and  vent.
However,  it  isn’t  just  governments  that  censor  social
media.  Through  the  collection  of  forums  that  makes  up  much
of  modern  social  media,  people  are  able  curate  their  feeds
to  decrease  the  amount  of  undesirable  concept  exposures,
and  ordinary  people  who  are  moderating  their  forums,  from
Reddit  to  Facebook  groups,  have  the  ability  to  censor  out
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viewpoints  they  disagree  with.  This  can  substantially  shift
the  perceived  dialogue  and  change  the  political
conversation  (Ashokkumar  et  al,  2020).
The  effect  social  media  has  on  campaigns  can  also  be
seen  as  a  positive  in  many  ways.  Many  candidates  use  social
media  to  broadcast  an  image  of  not  being  part  of  the
“establishment”  (Gainous  and  Wagner,  2014)  to  separate
themselves  from  career  politicians  that  many  people  see  as
the  “problem”.  President  Trump  in  2016  was  often  seen  as
“authentic”  by  many  of  his  followers,  he  led  a  campaign
that  was  seen  as  amateurish  and  not  the  kind  of  campaign
that  a  professional  politician  would  use  to  run  for
president.  This  is  especially  evident  when  compared  to  the
highly  professional  campaign  of  Hilary  Clinton.  But,  this
perceived  difference  led  to  excitement  and  trust  that
propelled  him  into  office  (Enli,  2017)
The  internet  has  long  been  feared  as  a  method  to
incite  polarization.  Much  of  our  common  ground  is  weakened
when  we  get  news  from  our  preferred  sources,  rather  than
shared  common  ground.  This  leads  to  increased  anger  at  the
opposing  party  (DiMaggio  et  al,  2001;  Hasell  &  Weeks,
2016).  Social  media  has  accelerated  this   polarization  on
the  political  spectrum.  Grover  (2019)  suggests  that  this
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can  be  linked  in  part  to  the  difference  in  messaging  of
major  candidates  in  an  election.  Candidates  are  able  to  use
social  media  to  influence  party  attitudes,  by  making
personal  views  into  specific  political  positions,  and
making  that  part  of  the  platform.  The  ensuing  shares  and
retweets  allow  it  to  appear  as  a  part  of  the  parties
mainstream  beliefs  (Grover  et  al,  2019).
Social  media  also  allows  people  to  let  out  their  anger
and  hate  through  social  media,  with  little  consequence.
This  lack  of  self  moderation  leads  to  people  having  more
extreme  attitudes  and  increased  conflict  (Altheide,  2016).
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The  Digital  Divide
Political  participants  are  not  all  influenced  equally
by  social  media  and  the  internet.  There  are  several  major
areas  of  “digital  divide”  that  affect  the  way  people  access
the  internet,  what  people  do  when  they  access  the  web,  the
quality  of  an  individual's  access,  and  what  types  of  social
media  they  use.
This  divide  has  multiple  distinct  rifts.  Quality  of
access  is  one  of  the  first  issues.  Access  varies  from
country  to  country  and  is  impacted  by,  and  directly  affects
the  economics  of  each  country.  Poorer  populations  are  less
able  to  afford  internet  access.  Because  of  the  relative
poverty,  development  of  infrastructure  that  lowers  cost  and
adds  accessibility  is  unattractive.  Cultural  and  language
variables  play  a  direct  role  on  internet  usage;  those  able
to  understand  languages  spoken  by  larger  populations  are
distinctly  advantaged  over  those  who  speak  smaller  and
local  dialects  (Guillen  &  Suarez,  2005).  Many  of  the  same
issues  impact  access  in  rural  areas,  where  access  may  be
slower,  and  urban  areas,  where  there  is  limited  cost
effective,  quality  internet  connection.  The  cross-cultural
divide  between  rural  and  urban  cultures  also  has  affected
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the  amount  of  time  it  has  taken  for  those  populations  to
adopt  internet  use  (Hindman,  2000).
In  rural  areas,  this  lack  of  experience  with  the
internet  leaves  people  with  less  “information  literacy.”
This  leaves  them  more  vulnerable  to  misleading  and  abusive
content  on  the  internet.  Whether  fake  news,  or  people
trying  to  defraud  them,  rural  populations  are  more
vulnerable  to  those  trying  to  take  advantage  of  them  (Yu  et
al,  2017;2015).
Many  of  those  factors  have  decreased  through  time,
trade,  and  cultural  imperialism.  People  throughout  much  of
the  world  have  access  to  the  global  economy  through  the
internet  than  ever  before  (Friedman,  2005).  The  legacy  of
lack  of  access  in  those  areas  still  impacts  the  populations
of  those  countries  and  rural  areas  as  a  whole.  This
economic  element  of  the  digital  divide  that  has  had  a
lasting  impact  on  the  people’s  health,  education,
communication,  and  economic  viability.  This  exacerbates  the
issue  leading  to  groups  falling  further  and  further  behind
(Bertot,  2003).  Those  who  are  digitally  disadvantaged  are
more  vulnerable  to  behavioral  control  and  emotional
manipulation  through  those  mediums  (Hsiah  et  al,  2006).
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Another  critical  rift  is  age,  older  populations  are
generally  less  likely  to  use  the  internet  than  younger
groups.  Their  use  of  social  media  is  also  a  more  recent
development,  generally  motivated  by  social  connection  to
friends  and  family  (Friemel,  2014).
This  divide  doesn’t  heavily  impact  the  economic
potential  of  the  older  populations.  Older  populations  are
often  either  firmly  established  in  their  careers,  or
retired  (Hunsaker  &  Hargittai,  2018).  While  it  is  heavily
affected  by  their  socioeconomic  status,it  is  exacerbated  by
older  populations'  lack  of  desire,  or  perceived  need,  to
adopt  new  technologies  (Niehaves  &  Plattfaut,  2014).
 This  digital  divide  impacts  their  health,  both  social
and  physical.  This  use  both  increases  mental  activity,
lowering  the  risk  of  developing  mental  impairment,  and
increases  education  about  health  issues  they  are  facing
(Hunsaker  &  Hargittai,  2018).
Social  interactions  are  also  dramatically  lower
amongst  seniors  that  don’t  use  the  internet.  This  has  a
negative  impact  on  their  community  connections   and  social
capital  (DiMaggio  et  al,  2001).  They  are  also  left  more
vulnerable  to  disinformation  due  to  lack  of  “information
literacy”  (Yu  et  al,  2015).
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This  concept  of  a  digital  divide  leads  to  both
digitally  advantaged  and  disadvantaged  groups.  The
disadvantaged  groups  may  be  more  vulnerable  to  fake  news
and  populist  propaganda,  making  them  more  easily
influenced.  Fear  is  often  utilized  in  many  types  of




Political  fear  has  been  examined  most  commonly   as  a
precursor  for  a  political  ideology.   Evidence  suggests  that
fear  is  a  precursor  for  conservative  ideas  and  beliefs,  or
that  a  specific  set  of  cognitive  biases  are  related  to
conservatism.  That  the  inability  to  cope  with  underlying
fear  and  uncertainty  plays  a  role  in  the  development  of
conservative  political  beliefs(Jost,  et  al  2003).
Perceived  threat,  regardless  of  political
identification,  is  shown  to  impact  support  for  policies  of
varying  kinds.  People  with  identified  fear  supported  action
in  Afghanistan  at  a  higher  rate  post  9/11  then  others,
regardless  of  political  disposition(Huddy,  et  al  2005).
The  physiological  fear  response  is  notably  different
in  people.  Those  who  have  a  stronger  startle  response  to
gunshots  or  threatening  images  were  more  likely  to  have
strong  feelings  about  security.  The  manifestation  occurs  in
various  ways,  such  as  being  pro  gun  and  owning  weapons,  or
being  in  favor  of  increased  defense  spending(Oxley  et  al
2008).
Critically,  fear  is  shown  to  directly  affect  political
behavior.  Fear  is  shown  to  have  a  significant  effect  on
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political  participation  when  competing  for  resources;  fear
and  anger  both  had  a  dramatically  stronger  effect  than
enthusiasm.  When  controlling  for  political  skills  and
resources,  fear  also  had  the  strongest  effect  of  the
emotional  categories.  For  “cheap”  participation  such  as  a
bumper  sticker,  voting  or  talking  about  a  candidate,  fear
has  a  stronger  effect  on  political  behavior  than  enthusiasm
or  anger,  although  anger  is  far  more  likely  to  illicit
contributions  (Valentino  et  al,  2011).
Fear  has  played  an  increasing  role  in  our  political
discourse.  Past  politicians  stoked  fear  of  outside  forces,
such  as  Nazis  or  Soviets;  now  leadership  plays  on  fear  of
internal  opposition.  A  cultural  divide  has  developed  that
creates  a  primal  “us  vs  them”  response,  causing  people  to
fear  the  position  of  the  other  team,  and  that  it  will  harm
them(Iyengar  et  al  2014).
Populist  candidates  throughout  the  world  are  found  to
use  political  messaging  and  appeals  that  are  more  likely  to
use  negative  emotions.  Fear,  anger,  disgust  and  sadness  are
used  far  more  often  to  elicit  strong  responses  (Windmann,
2020).  As  a  wise  alien  once  said  “Fear  is  the  path  to  the
dark  side…fear  leads  to  anger…anger  leads  to  hate…hate
leads  to  suffering”  (Lucas,  1999)  While  not  an  authority  on
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psychology,  there  is  truth  to  the  idea  that  negative
emotions  can  lead  to  a  powerful  and  dangerous  wave  of
political  power  that  populist  candidates  have  ridden  to
power  in  many  places  and  times.
Fear  encourages  people  to  speak  their  minds,  it
triggers  the  fight  or  flight  response  which  either  way,
leads  to  action.  Altheide  (2016)  suggests  that  Trump
purposefully  incited  political  fear,  and  pushed  people  to
“speak  their  minds.”  This  allowed  people  to  bring  their
bigotry  and  impulsivity  to  the  forefront.  Social  media  then
allows  people  a  nearly  consequence  free  place  to  spit  their
vitriol.  This  magnified  the  emotional  momentum  and  led
people  who  would  not  normally  act  (vote)  to  go  and  act
(Altheide,  2016)
Fear  is  also  used  by  populist  candidates  by
effectively  engineering  a  threat,  and  then  to  create  a
clear  and  concise  answer  that  their  ideological  opposites
have  trouble  competing  with.  If  Trump’s  campaign  could  make
undecided  voters  afraid  of  the  threat  of  “undocumented
murderous  rapist  immigrants  flowing  like  a  river  across  the
unprotected  border”  then  they  tell  you  that  they  have  a
solution,  then  the  opposition’s  response  of,  “they  aren’t  a
threat,  and  the  solution  won’t  work”  is  not  effective
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because  it  doesn’t  deal  with  the  emotional  response.
Similar  rhetoric  was  used  in  Brexit,  suddenly  politicians
were  convincing  the  people  that  “the  rest  of  the  European
Union  will  drag  us  down  and  destroy  who  we  are,  and  so  we
have  a  plan  to  deal  with  it!”  It  is  much  more  enticing  than
the  counterpoint,  “No  they  won’t”.  These  fear  messages  not
only  radicalize  their  base,  they  attract  voters  to  take  a
side  on  an  issue  to  which  they  were  previously  unconcerned
(Scheller,  2019).
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Media’s  Impact  on  Emotions
The  media  has  utilized  and  been  driven  by  fear  since
long  before  the  internet  and  the  silicon  valley  appended
“social”  prefix.  Traditional  media  and  governments  have
long  used  fear  as  a  form  of  social  control.  While  fear  may
be  obvious  as  a  motivator  for  anti  crime  bills  or  military
spending  bills,  this  can  be  expanded  into  many  other  areas
of  influence.  When  framing  issues  with  fear,  broadcasters
have  been  able  to  make  their  stories  familiar  and  the
importance  of  the  issue  more  pronounced  (Altheide  &
Machalowski,  1999).
The  Hollywood  media  has  also  changed  the  way  we
process  and  appreciate  fears.  Fear  was  made  into  something
fun  and  interesting  through  the  development  of  suspense
thrillers  and  horror  movies.  This  further  increases  the
effectiveness  of  the  fear  framing  by  making  this  something
that  people  are  conditioned  to  be  intrigued  by  rather  than
something  that  some  people  would  want  to  avoid  (Altheide  &
Machalowski,  1999).
These  discourses  of  fear  lead  things  to  be  framed
specifically  through  the  lens  of  fear.  After  the  Columbine
shooting,  media  outlets  used  the  leverage  of  fear  to  go
after  specific  elements  that  they  believed  were
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problematic.  They  framed  “outsiders”  as  potential  school
shooters,  and  used  the  event  as  leverage  to  change  the
discussion  about  security  and  the  role  of  police  in  school.
While  intended  to  make  students  safer,  it  would  often  lead
to  targeting  students  who  were  different  from  the  group  or
didn’t  fit  in,  in  the  name  of  “safety”.  Getting  away  from
the  narrative  that  people  wanted  to  present  and  allowing
fear  to  take  the  center  stage  (Altheide,  2009).  Media’s
presentation  of  much  of  the  world  through  a  “problem  frame”
uses  fear  to  drive  a  narrative  meant  to  influence  the
masses  and  create  “social  control”,  allowing  the  media  to
continue  to  profit  by  keeping  people  afraid  (Altheide,
2004).
Emotion  is  heavily  used  in  journalism,  while  some
“purists”  view  it  as  sensationalism  and  the  practice  of
tabloids,  but  the  news  has  always  been  closely  intertwined
with  emotions  even  when  people  want  to  deny  it.  People
connect  to  the  story  with  their  interior  world  of  emotions.
But  denying  that  events  that  affect  people  are  emotionally
important  does  not  lead  to  good  reporting,  or  even  good
dissemination  of  information  (Peters,  2011).
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Social  Media  and  Emotions
Because  of  the  nature  of  the  hybrid  media,  all  of  the
ways  that  traditional  media  influences  emotions  are  still
true  for  social  media,  broadcasters  and  organizations  dove
headfirst  into  utilizing  social  media  to  advance  many  of
their  ongoing  efforts.  Pulling  the  new  tools  into  the  same
mission,  just  like  radio,  television  and  every  other  major
change  has  been  put  to  use  by  the  actors  already  in  motion
(Chadwick,  2017).
Social  media,  and  the  fast  paced  movement  of  internet
users  in  the  social  media  era,  has  also  accelerated  changes
in  the  way  the  media  presents  information.  Social  media
prompted  a  trend  towards  reducing  events  into  bite  size
pieces  of  “news”,  with  a  beginning,  middle  and  ending,
rather  than  an  ongoing  story  that  affects  society.  It  also
accelerated  and  reduced  political  communication  into  simple
messages,  rather  than  an  ongoing  conversation  (Altheide,
2004).
Catchy  and  sensationalized  titles,  often  referred  to
as  clickbait,  are  designed  to  elicit  a  quick  emotional
response  to  engage  readers  with  the  content.  Readers  become
more  sensitive  to  the  emotional  pleas  of  this  practice,
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rewarding  media  elements  that  use  this  emotional
manipulation  (Blom  &  Hansen,  2014.)
The  effects  of  social  media  have  had  both  positive  and
negative  effects  on  journalism  and  the  media.  While  it
fosters  connections  with  journalists,  politicians,  actors
and  other  public  icons,  it  creates  a  two  way  connection
that   previously  did  not  exist.  New  players  now  have  the
bandwidth  to  influence  media  operators  as  powerfully  as
traditional  politicians  and  media.  Conversely,  it  also
leads  to  increased  harassment  and  pressures  on  those
people,  impacting  the  emotions  and  actions  of  the
influencers  on  our  society  (Lewis  &  Molyneux,  2018).
Social  media  has  a  unique  set  of  effects  on  how  people
interact  with  each  other  and  the  world,  and  has  new  and
powerful  effects  on  emotions.  Emotions  spread  like  wildfire
on  social  media.  Emotionally  charged  tweets,  both  positive
and  negative,  are  more  likely  to  be  retweeted  than
emotionally  neutral  and  informational  tweets.  Stieglitz  and
Dang-Xuan  (2014)  demonstrate  that  emotionally  charged
tweets  are  retweeted  more  often,  and  with  less  delay
between  posting,  reading  and  retweets.  This  increases  the
likelihood  of  people  using  emotionally  charged  tweets,  and
inundates  the  Twitter  user  with  emotionally  charged
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material.  Emotionally  charged  information  has  become
dramatically  more  available  to  people  than  strictly
objective  and  data  driven  information  (Stieglitz  &
Dang-Xuan,  2013).  Further,  “soft”  news  and  information
about  things  like  relationships  and  education  is  much  more
likely  to  be  engaged  with  than  “hard”  news  issues  like
politics  or  current  events  (Kalsnes  &  Larsson,  2018).
Emotions  also  directly  affect  behavior  on  social
media.  Anger  and  fear  specifically  influence  our  online
behavior  in  combative  ways,  different  from  excitedly
sharing.  It  has  been  found  that  angry  people  are  more
likely  to  be  involved  in  online  debate,  and  conflict  with
other  people.  This  effect  is  observed  with  both  political
and  nonpolitical  discussions.  While  it  can’t  be  ruled  out
that  it  may  be  the  debating  online  itself  that  is  making
them  angry,  it  creates  a  feedback  loop  of  negative  emotion
reenforcing  the  behavior  (Wollebaek  et  al  2019).
Emotional  contagion  is  also  a  major  factor  in  social
media,  as  the  general  attitudes  of  the  posts  that  people
see  affect  both  their  current  emotional  state,  as  well  as
the  ongoing  emotional  attitude  about  an  issue.  Anger  also
leads  to  increased  sharing  or  retweeting  and  posts  about  a
given  issue  (Kramer  et  al,  2014).
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Social  Media  Use  and  Fear
Social  media’s  effect  on  some  types  of  emotions  have
been  studied  extensively.  Specifically  there  is  a  large
body  of  literature,  both  academically  and  in  popular  blogs
and  websites,  that  addresses  the  effect  Social  media  has  on
the  “Fear  of  Missing  Out”  popularized  as  the  acronym  FoMO.
This  fear  is  an  anxiety  that  there  are  rewarding
experiences  out  there  that  they  are  missing.  This  keeps
them  wanting  to  be  constantly  engaged  with  their  social
media  platforms  in  order  to  make  sure  they  don’t  miss
things.  This  leads  to  increased  distraction  and  negative
academic  performance,  and  increased  likelihood  of  checking
texts  and  notifications  while  driving  decreasing  safety  for
themselves  and  those  around  them  (Przybylski  et  al,  2013).
This  general  stressor  can  also  lead  to  increased
relationship  tension  as  the  demands  of  keeping  up  with
expectations,  jealousy  of  others  experiences,  and  tension
that  comes  from  conflict  and  drama  that  is  specific  to  the
social  media  experience.  These  forces  create  anxiety  and
strain  on  people’s  minds.  A  negative  feedback  loop  forms  in
which  the  anxiety  it  creates  is  directly  responsible  for
making  users  more  likely  to  continue  checking  their  social
media  to  keep  up  with  said  conflicts  (Fox  &  Moreland  2014).
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These  social  media  addictions  can  also  catalyze  mental
health  disorders,  especially  anxiety.  Anxiety  is  often  used
interchangeably  with  fear.  One  of  the  obvious  primary
symptoms  of  anxiety  disorders  is  varying  levels  of  chronic
fear/anxiety  throughout  life  which  has  been  triggered  or
exacerbated  by  social  media  use  (Rosen  2013;  Woods  &  Scott
2016).
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Social  Media  Use  and  Political  Fear  and  Anger
Politicians  on  both  sides  of  the  political  spectrum
leverage  fear,  anger  and  other  negative  emotions  through
their  social  media  accounts  addressing  the  population.  They
use  these  negative  emotions  to  highlight  issues  that  are
critical  to  their  base,  and  color  their  statements  about
each  issue  with  emotional  tones  to  affect  the  way  people
think  about  those  issues.  This  may  lead  to  increased
polarization  when  our  political  positions  are  so  highly
influenced  by  emotions  rather  than  “ownership”  (Enders,
Gainous,  and  Wagner,  2020)
Social  media  has  also  been  used  effectively  to  spread
disinformation  and  increase  Islamophobia  in  much  of  the
world.  By  focusing  on  a  threat,  political  actors  are  able
increase  the  strength  of  their  general  position.  By  being
able  to  circumvent  the  “political  correct”  phrasing  and
statements  through  the  use  of  social  media,  blogs  and
highly  partisan  news  sources  they  are  able  to  disseminate
ideas  that  spread  naturally  and  shift  the  over  ideology  of
a  party  (Ekman,  2015).
During  the  Covid  19  crisis  Trump  has  used  social  media
to  lash  out  at,  and  spread  doubt  and  fear  not  about  the
disease,  but  rather  the  scientists  and  doctors  who  were
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meant  to  be  tracking  and  treating  the  disease.  Directly
using  social  media  to  change  the  dialogue  from  one  of  unity
against  the  pandemic  and  created  doubt  and  anger  at
democrats  or  the  “deep  state”  who  he  believed  were  hyping
the  pandemic  to  make  him  look  bad  (Altheide,  2020).
Fear  has  not  been  shown  to  keep  people  from  viewing
and  searching  out  alternate  political  information.  It  has,
in  fact,  been  found  to  have  some  effect  on  encouraging
people  to  go  out  and  find  conflicting  information.  Anger,
however,  consistently  kept  people  from  pursuing  sources  of
information  that  would  present  information  through  an
opposing  lens,  thereby  strengthening  the  walls  of  the  “echo
chamber”.  Both  emotions  are  consistently  found  to  increase
online  political  participation  through  social  media
(Wollebaek  et  al,  2019).
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Hypotheses
First,  social  media  has  a  distinct  effect  on  emotions
that  is  likely  to  be  stronger  than  traditional  media.  Due
to  the  emotionally  engaging  nature  of  social  media,  this
could  directly  affect  the  behavior  of  voters.  If
interactions  through  social  media  are  able  to  get  people  to
protest  against  the  government,  it  should  easily  have
influence  on  policy  positions.
Second,  throughout  the  literature,  there  is  the
concept  of  the  “digital  divide.”  It  demonstrates  that
younger  populations  are  significantly  more  engaged  in
social  media,  but  also  have  increased  “information
literacy”  that  helps  to  insulate  them  from  some  elements  of
political  manipulation.  Digitally  disadvantaged  populations
are  more  easily  manipulated  through  digital  media  (Hsiah  et
al,  2006;  Yu  et  al,  2017;2015)  Anecdotally,  evidence
suggests  that  it  is  the  older  population  that  is  more
easily  influenced  by  fear  mongering  techniques.  This  could
be  especially  important  for  the  greater  body  of  knowledge
if  we  can  demonstrate  this  increased  impact  despite  the
decreased  use  due  to  the  digital  divide.
My  hypothesis  is  that  the  dependent  variable  fear
increases  with  our  independent  variable  of  social  media
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use.  Furthermore,  this  effect  will  be  stronger  amongst
cohorts  that  did  not  grow  up  with  social  media,  and  lack
some  “internet  information  literacy”  such  as  Gen  X  and
Boomers.
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CHAPTER  3:  DATA  AND  MEASUREMENT
The  data  for  this  study  came  from  two  major  sources,
and  is  made  up  of  individual-level  data.  This  data  came
from  the  2016  American  National  Election  Studies,  as  well
as  the  2012  American  National  Election  Studies.  The
American  National  Election  Studies  is  a  time-series
collection  of  national  surveys  conducted  during  every
presidential  election  since  1948.  The  questions  are  split
between  those  designed  to  track  long-term  trends,  and  those
designed  to  help  us  understand  that  moment  in  politics.  The
2012  ANES  was  completed  through  both  face  to  face  (n=2,054)
and  internet  (n=3,860)  surveys  for  a  total  of  5,914
observations.   The  2016  ANES  was  completed  through  both
face  to  face  (n=1,181)  and  internet  (n=3,090)  surveys  for  a
total  of  4,271  observations.  My  basic  strategy  is  to
estimate  the  relationship  between  an  index  of  questions
that  I  created  to  measure  fear  and  determine  if  it  is
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related  to  an  index  I  created  to  measure  social  media
usage.
As  highlighted  above,  my  analysis  is  aimed  at
answering  the  following  questions:  does  social  media  usage
have  a  positive  impact  on  self-reported  fear  indicators?  If
there  is  a  positive  effect  between  social  media  use  and
fear,  is  that  effect  stronger  in  Gen  X  and  Boomer  cohorts?
The  first  question  is  whether  social  media  use  has  a
positive  effect  on  self-reported  fear  and  anxiety
indicators.  This  question  is  analyzed  using  multiple
indexes  and  using  multivariate  regression.
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Social  Media  Usage  Index
The  first  index  of  social  media  use  was  created  using
social  media  indicators  weighted  and  measured  to  accurately
measure  social  media  usage.  In  the  ANES  2012  (Figure  3.1)
survey  data  this  was
accomplished  by  using
an  additive  index  of
three  items,  with  a
Cronbach  Alpha  score  of
.71  suggesting  a  high
internal  consistency,
the  first  is  “During  a
typical  week,  how  many
days  do  you  use  social
media  such  as  Twitter
or  Facebook  to  learn  about  the  election  for  President?“
The  responses  were  on  an  eight  point  scale  with  answers
that  ranged  from  “None”,  to  “Seven  Days”.  After  that
indicator  I  also  used  the  political  affairs  profile
variables,  “How  often  politics  social  media”  with  answers
ranging  from  and  “Does  not  apply”  to  “A  lot”;  and  the
variable  “Politics  info  from  social  media”  with  answers
ranging  from  “Never”  to  “Every  day”.  The  wording  of  the
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original  questions  for  the  political  affairs  profile
variables  are  not  available.  All  of  the  variables  were
ordered  so  that  the  higher  number  is  higher  levels  of
social  media  use,  and  lower  numbers  are  lower  levels  of
social  media  use.  All  three  items  were  rescaled  to  range
from  0  to  1,  while  still  maintaining  the  same  intervals.
This  shows  distribution  heavy  in  low  scores  with  many
people  not  using  social  media  heavily  in  2012  for  political
purposes.
In  the  ANES  2016  survey  data  the  social  media  index
(Figure  3.2)  was  created  from  two  items.  The  first  is
“During  a  typical  week,
how  many  days  do  you  use
social  media  such  as
Twitter  or  Facebook?”
The  responses  were  on  an
eight  point  scale  with
answers  that  ranged  from
“none”,  up  to  “Seven
Days”.  Then  the  question
“How  many  times  did  you
read,  watch,  or  listen
to  any  information  about  the  campaign  for  President  on  the
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Internet?”  which  had  answers  on  a  4  point  scale  with
answers  ranging  from  “None”  to  “A  good  many”.  Each  of  these
items  were  ordered  so  that  higher  internet/social  media  use
were  represented  by  higher  values.  Then  all  items  were
rescaled  to  range  from  0  to  1,  while  still  maintaining  the
same  intervals.  Then  the  variables  were  summed  to  again
create  an  additive  index,  with  cronbach  alpha  score  of  .38,
while  this  does  not  suggest  a  high  level  of  consistency,  I
am  using  it  to  create  a  new  variable  that  measures  use  of
social  media  for  political  news.  The  2016  distribution  is
dramatically  different  from  the  2012  distribution  because
of  massively  increased  social  media  use,  and  an  increase  in
its  use  for  political  purposes.
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Candidate  Fear  Index
Then  I  created  my  “candidate  fear  index”.  This  is
based  on  the  questions  “Does  the  Republican/Democratic
candidate  make  you  feel  afraid?”  In  the  2012  ANES  survey
data  the  questions
asked  were  “Has  Barack
Obama,  because  of  the
kind  of  person  he  is  or
because  of  something  he
has  done,  ever  made  you
feel  afraid?”  Which  was
answered  with  a  simple
“yes”  or  “no”.  And  “Has
Mitt  Romney,  because  of
the  kind  of  person  he
is  or  because  of  something  he  has  done,  ever  made  you  feel
afraid?”,  which  was  also  answered  with  a  “yes”  or  “no”.  The
candidate  fear  index  (Figure  3.3)  added  these  two  together
which  created  a  new  variable  where  most  voters  said  they
were  afraid  of  one,  many  said  they  were  afraid  of  neither,
and  a  few  said  they  were  afraid  of  both.  This  item  is
ordered  so  that  higher  fear  is  represented  by  higher
values,  rescaled  to  range  from  0  to  1,  while  still
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maintaining  the  same  intervals.  The  responses  to  these
questions  were  combined  into  a  single  variable,  and  an
average  fear  was  created  between  the  two,  this  eliminated
most  of  the  partisanship  bias  because  it  created  a
measurement  of  fearing  a  candidate,  rather  than  a  specific
candidate.
In  the  2016  ANES  survey  data  the  questions  were  “How
often  would  you  say  you’ve  felt  afraid  because  of  the  kind
of  person  Hillary  Clinton  is  or  because  of  something  she
has  done?”  The  counterpart  question  was  “How  often  would
you  say  you’ve  felt  afraid  because  of  the  kind  of  person
Donald  Trump  is  or  because  of  something  he  has  done?”  Both
of  these  items  were  measured  on  the  same  five  point  scale
(never,  some  of  the
time,  about  half  the
time,  most  of  the  time,
or  always).  The  same
procedure  was  done  to
add  the  two  variables
together  to  create  an
average  candidate  fear
index.  This  index
appears  very  different
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from  the  2012  index  because  there  is  a  higher  range  of
answers.  The  distribution  (Figure  3.4)  for  this  item  shows
that  many  people  reported  that  they  are  “always”  afraid  of
at  least  one  candidate,  with  some  even  reporting  that  they
are  “always”  afraid  of  both  candidates.  This  item  is
ordered  so  that  higher  fear  is  represented  by  higher
values,  rescaled  to  range  from  0  to  1,  while  still
maintaining  the  same  intervals.
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Economic  Fear  Index
Then  a  series  of  questions  deemed  “economic  anxiety”
indicators  were  added  together  to  create  my  Economic  Fear
Index.  These  are  questions  such  as  “How  much  better/worse
off  will  you  be  next  year?”,  “How  much  better/worse  will
unemployment  be  in  the  next  year?”,  and  ”Will  the  economy
be  better  or  worse  in  the  next  12  months?”.
In  the  ANES  2012
survey  data  the
questions  used  in  this
index  (Figure  3.5)  are
“What  about  the  next  12
months?  Do  you  expect
the  economy,  in  the
country  as  a  whole,  to
get  better ,  stay  about
the  same ,  or  get
worse ?”  with  the
italicized  words  being  the  options  on  a  three  point  scale.
The  next  question  used  was  “How  about  people  out  of  work
during  the  coming  12  months,  do  you  think  that  there  will
be  more  unemployment  than  now,  about  the  same ,  or  less ?”
also  with  a  three  point  scale.  Then  finally  “Now  looking
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ahead,  do  you  think  that  a  year  from  now  you  and  your
family  will  be  better  off  financially,  worse  off ,  or  just
about  the  same  as  now?”  this  item  had  to  be  rearranged  as
worse  off  was  the  middle  answer.  All  three  of  these
responses  were  reordered  so  that  higher  economic  fear  is
represented  by  higher  values,  then  added  together  using  the
same  procedure  as  the  other  indices,  and  then  rescaled  to
range  from  0  to  1,  while  still  maintaining  the  same
intervals.  Then  summed  into  an  additive  index  with  a
Cronbach  Alpha  score  of  .66  suggesting  a  high  internal
consistency.  The  distribution  shows  that  more  people
believed  that  the  economy  would  improve  than  people  who
believed  it  would  get  worse,  with  the  majority  clustered
toward  staying  about
the  same.
For  the  ANES  2016
survey  data  (Figure
3.6)  the  first  question
used  was  nearly
identical  as  2012  “What
about  the  next  12
months?  Do  you  expect
the  economy,  in  the
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country  as  a  whole,  to  get  better ,  stay  about  the  same ,  or
get  worse ?”  with  the  italicized  sections  being  the  possible
answers  on  a  three  point  scale.  The  next  question  is  “How
about  people  out  of  work  during  the  coming  12  months,  do
you  think  that  there  will  be  more  unemployment  than  now,
about  the  same ,  or  less ?”  on  a  three  point  scale.  The  last
question  in  this  index  is  “Now  looking  ahead,  do  you  think
that  a  year  from  now  you  and  your  family  will  be  much
better  off  financially,  somewhat  better  off ,  about  the
same ,  somewhat  worse  off ,  or  much  worse  off  than  now? ”  on  a
five  point  scale.  These  were  combined  into  an  additive
index  using  the  same  procedure  as  the  previous  index,
reordered  so  that  higher  economic  fear  is  represented  by
higher  values,  and  then  rescaled  to  range  from  0  to  1,
while  still  maintaining  the  same  intervals.This  index  has  a
Cronbach  Alpha  score  of  .56  suggesting  a  moderate  level
internal  consistency,  in  the  2016.  The  distribution  for
this  item  shows  that  the  majority  believe  the  economy  will
stay  about  the  same  over  the  next  12  months,  with  a  roughly
even  distribution  between  those  who  believe  it  will  get
better  and  those  that  believe  that  it  will  get  worse.
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Controls
Finally,  control  indexes  such  as  socioeconomic  status,
age,  ideology,  and  demographics  were  controlled  for  in  a
multivariate  regression  model.  This  included  questions  in
both  models  for  self  reported  gender,  with  a  two  point
scale  of  male  and  female,  with  a  dummy  variable  created
where  females  are  represented  by  the  higher  value.  The  next
control  is  ethnicity,  in  the  ANES  2016  survey  data  the
respondent  was  given  the  options  White  (non-Hispanic),
Black  (non-Hispanic),  Asian,  native  Hawaiian  or  other
Pacific  Island  (non-Hispanic),  Native  American  or  Alaska
Native  (non-Hispanic),  Hispanic,  and  Other  (non-Hispanic).
On  the  2012  ANES  survey  data  the  respondent  was  given  the
options  White  (non-Hispanic),  Black  (non-Hispanic),
Hispanic,  and  Other  (non-Hispanic).  For  both  of  these
questions  they  were  seperated  into  “White”  and  “Other”
because  there  were  not  enough  respondents  of  the  smaller
minorities  to  create  a  representative  sample.  A  dummy
variable  was  created  where  those  who  identified  as  white
are  represented  by  the  higher  value.
Age  is  represented  in  such  a  way  that  advanced  age  is
represented  by  a  higher  value.
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A  socio  economic  status  index  was  also  created  this
included  two  items  that  indicated  education  and  income.
Both  variables  were  reordered,  so  that  increased  income  and
increased  education  are  represented  by  higher  values.
Rescaled  from  0  to  1  and  summed.
Ideology  is  controlled  by  use  of  the  seven  point  scale
liberal/conservative  self  placement.  These  were  arranged  so
that  those  who  identified  as  more  conservative  are
represented  by  a  higher  value,  and  more  liberal  represented
by  a  lower  value.
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Generational  Cohorts
The  second  question  centers  on  whether  the  correlation
between  social  media  use  and  fear  is  stronger  in  Gen  X  and
Boomer  cohorts  than  in  the  Millennial  cohort.  I  will  look
at  this  in  a  couple  of  ways.  First,  during  my  regression
modeling  I  will  determine  if  the  effect  gets  stronger  with
age.  Then  I  will  subset  out  each  cohort.  The  cohorts  will
be  drawn  from  the  Strauss-Howe  generational  theory,  divided
as  Boomers,  who  are  those  born  between  1940  and  1964,  Gen
Xers,  who  are  those  born  between  1964  and  1984,  and
Millenials,  who  are  those  born  between  1984  and  2000.  Each
of  these  subsets  will  be  run  through  the  same  regression
models  and  the  differences  will  be  evaluated.
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Limitations
Some  of  the  issues  I  encountered  are  whether  my
indicators  are  effectively  measuring  fear.  The  primary  fear
based  question  is  “Does  the  Democratic/Republican
presidential  candidate
make  you  feel  afraid?”
This  could  be  construed
as  a  question  that  only
really  measures
partisanship  rather
than  fear.  The
questions  about  the
next  year  may  also  not
be  measuring  general
fear/anxiety,  it  might
be  that  it  better  measures  hope  or  lack  of  hope.  So  the
primary  issue  is  whether  I  can  effectively  measure  fear
using  the  ANES  data.
After  developing  the  first  model  a  specific  issue
though  was  discerned.  Social  media  Usage  had  no  relevant
effect  on  my  initial  “Fear  Index”.  I  quickly  realized  the
first  problem  with  these  hypothesized  results:  social  media
use  has  a  different  effect  on  fear  of  candidates  than  on
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fear  about  the  economy.
This  was  the  same
initial  results  that
were  found  in  both  the
2012  ANES  data  and  the
2016  ANES  data.
After  discovering
this  no  more  attempts
were  made  to  combine
the  Candidate  Fear
Index  with  the  Economic
Fear  Index  and  they  are  treated  as  separate  dependent
variables.
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CHAPTER  4:  MODELING  RESULTS
Modeling  the  2012  ANES  Survey  Data
The  first
model  (Table  4.1  &
Figure  4.1)  looks
specifically  at
the  2012  ANES
data.  Here  my  aim
was  to  determine
whether  social
media  has  a
positive  effect  on
self  reported  fear
indicators.  The  results  are  apparent  and  statistically
significant.  While  controlling  for  major  intervening
factors.  The  results  here  immediately  show  that  social
media  use  has  a  statistically  significant  effect  on
candidate  fear  indicators.
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This  result  was
stronger  amongst
the  Millennial
cohort  than  the
overall  ANES  2012
population  or  any
of  the  other
individual
generational
cohorts.  This  is
contrary  to  my
expectations  as  I
expected  due  to  the
digital  divide  the  older  cohorts  would  be  more  susceptible
to  that  influence.  I  was  unable  to  control  for  the  pure
volume  of  exposure  that  each  generation  actually  receives.
Since  older  populations  are  less  exposed  to  social  media,
especially  in  2012,  having  any  measurable  effect  is
significant.
I  see  a  significant  effect  on  the  dependent  variable
from  ideology  where  those  who  identify  as  more  conservative
correlated  with  self  reported  fear.  This  is  likely  because
President  Barack  Obama  is  a  more  controversial  figure  than
46
Senator  Mitt
Romney  whom  he
was  running
against.  Though
it  may  also  be
related  to  the
idea  that
conservatives  may
be  more  likely  to
respond  to  fear
(Jost,  et  al
2003).  This
correlation  is  demonstrated  with  the  positive  relationship
between  an  increase  in  conservatism  and  an  increase  in
candidate  fear  demonstrated  in  the  ideology  result  (Table
4.1).
The  second  model  (Table  4.2  &  Figure  4.2)  shows  that
while  it  has  a  positive  effect,  increasing  fear  about  the
presidential  candidates,  it  has  a  weak  negative  effect  on
Economic  Fear  indicators.  Respondents  across  the  ANES  2012
data  may  be  slightly  less  likely  to  believe  that  the
economy  or  their  individuals  financial  positions  are  likely
to  get  worse  the  more  they  use  social  media,  although  this
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is  not  a  statistically
significant  effect.
This  is
counterintuitive  to  my
initial  supposition
that  a  person  who  is
fearful  about  political
candidates  is  also
likely  to  be  fearful
about  the  economy.
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Modeling  the  2016  ANES  Survey  Data
In  this  second  set  of  models,  I  look  specifically  at
the  2016  ANES  data.  Effectively,  I  am  running  the  same
multivariate  regressions  for  the  2016  data  as  the  2012  data
This  model  has  a  degree  of  increased  nuance  because  the
questions  about  candidate  fear  had  a  broader  gradation  than
just  yes  or  no.  Moreover,  there  was  in  general  a  larger
amount  of  fear  in  the  2016  elections  cycle  than  there  was
in  2012.  There  was  also  a  dramatic  increase  in  social  media
use  across  all  cohorts  from  2012  to  2016.  With  the  majority
of  people  saying  they  regularly  get  political  news  through
social  media  in  2016,  rather  than  a  minority  saying  they
ever  get  political  news  through  social  media.  This  increase
in  variation  of  answers  allows  increased  confidence  in  the
2016  results.
In  the  first
model  (Table  4.3  &
Figure  4.3)  in  the









media  usage  and
candidate  fear.
Different  from  the
2012  models,  this
data  shows  that  not
only  does  social
media  use  have  an
effect  on  the
respondents  self
reporting  that  they
are  afraid  of  the
candidate(s),  but  it  also  shows  that  increased  social  media
usage  affects  the  amount  of  fear  that  the  respondents  are
willing  to  report.
This  effect  was  strongest  amongst  Millennials  and
Generation  X,  and  weakest  among  the  Boomer  cohort.  In  this
model  though  we  predict  an  effect  amongst  the  Boomers,  it
is  not  statistically  significant.  This  again  runs
counterintuitive  to  my  initial  hypotheses  that  the  effect
would  be  stronger  amongst  the  Generation  X  and  Boomer
cohorts.
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The  results  of  the
2016  economic
model  came  out
basically  the
same,  showing  that
social  media  use
still  has  a
negative  effect  on
economic  fear.  The
only  significant
correlations  with
economic  fear  ideology
with  those  who
identified  as  more
conservative  having  a
higher  self  reported
economic  fear.
The  overall
increase  in  fear  about
political  candidates
caused  by  social  media
usage  may  affect  voting  behavior.  Looking  at  the  basic
“Calculus  of  Voting”  equation  R  =  pB  −  C  +  D  (Riker  &
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Ordeshook  1968)  The  person  who  fears  an  opposing  candidate
has  an  increased  likelihood  of  voting  as  it  affects  both
the  “B”  variable,  which  is  the  perceived  differences
between  the  candidates.  If  a  voter  not  only  disagrees  with
the  candidate,  but  actively  fears  them,  this  suggests  that
there  is  like  a  larger  gap  between  the  two  options.  It  may
also  create  an  additional  effect  on  the  “D”  variable,  the
psychological  reward  for  voting,  as  it  creates  a  degree  of
satisfaction  about  standing  up  to  or  opposing  something
that  they  fear.
In  the  2016  election  we  saw  the  highest  voter  turnout
ever  after  campaigns  that  led  many  to  fear  both  candidates.
Despite  the  fact  that  it  was  the  highest  voter  turnout,  it
was  not  the  highest  percentage  turnout  of  eligible  voters.
This  effect  may  have  been  curtailed  by  the  fact  that  many
people  were  to  some  degree  afraid  of  both  candidates.  Some
people  may  not  have  seen  them  as  different,  but  rather  that
they  were  choosing  between  the  lesser  of  two  evils.
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CHAPTER  5:  DISCUSSION
My  primary  purpose  is  to  determine  if  social  media
usage  influences  fear  in  the  United  States.  The  internet  is
a  powerful  tool  in  American  culture.  It  may  be  able  to
cause  drastic  changes  in  political  attitudes,  adding  to  the
fear  level  of  the  overall  population.  I  hypothesized  that
social  media  use  will  increase  exposure  to  fear-inducing
news  and  political  propaganda,  therefore  increasing  fear.
Furthermore,  this  effect  is  getting  stronger  and  it  is
strongest  among  populations  that  have  not  grown  up
expecting  sensationalized,  partisan  news.
It  is  clear  social  media  usage  has  an  impact  on
political  fear.  In  2012  increased  social  media  usage
increased  the  likelihood  that  a  voter  would  express  fear  of
one  of  the  candidates.  In  2016  we  were  able  to  see  that  it
affected  how  often  the  people  felt  afraid  of  the  candidate.
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The  use  of  social  media  did  not  lead  to  a  more  fearful
person,  as  we  had  expected.  Rather,  while  it  increased
political  fear,  it  did  not  increase  economic  fear,  and
marginally  increased  economic  optimism.  Perhaps  people  who
were  using  social  media  were  more  likely  to  have  support
and  understand  technological  development,  which  is  the
largest  piece  of  our  economic  growth.
The  theorized  increased  impact  on  the  older  two
cohorts  was  not  evident  in  this  data.  The  theory  could  be
innately  wrong,  and  that  they  are  not  as  vulnerable  to  the
propaganda  and  fake  news  as  I  originally  predicted.  It  also
becomes  hard  to  measure  because  the  study  only  asks  how
many  days  a  week  that  people  are  using  social  media.
Perhaps,  if  we  were  able  to  control  for  hours  a  day  used,
or  which  platforms  are  being  used  we  may  see  different
results.
This  effect  will  likely  continue  to  grow  in  importance
and  impact  as  we  as  a  society  get  more  of  our  social
interaction,  media,  and  news  through  social  media  and  the
internet  in  general.  Its  usage  has  the  potential  to  make  us
more  aware  as  a  society  to  the  plight  of  others,  or  to  be
used  by  populists  and  those  with  ill  intentions  to  further
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